My cautious optimism for Zimbabwe’s 2012 elections by Bomba, Briggs
Opinions
Briggs Bomba
My cautious optimism for 
Zimbabwe’s 2012 elections
December 2011
Opinions
Text © Commonwealth Advisory Bureau
The information in this publication is believed to be correct at the time of manufacture. Whilst care has 
been taken to ensure that the information is accurate, the publisher can accept no responsibility for 
any errors or omissions or for changes to the details given. Views expressed in this publication are not 
necessarily those of the Commonwealth Advisory Bureau or the publisher.
First published 2011
ISBN: 978-0-9569546-5-7
Published by and available from the Commonwealth Advisory Bureau (CA/B)
Tel:  +44 (0)20 7862 8865
Fax:  +44 (0)20 7862 8813
Email:  CAB@sas.ac.uk
Web:  www.commonwealthadvisorybureau.org
Mail:  Commonwealth Advisory Bureau
 Institute of Commonwealth Studies
 Senate House
 University of London
 London
 WC1E 7HU
 United Kingdom
1In this Opinion, prominent Zimbabwean civil society activist Briggs Bomba argues that 2012 could to be a decisive 
year in Zimbabwe’s recent history. A number of domestic and international factors could come together to force the 
regime to hold democratic elections, and the transformed international scene – with the influence of the Arab spring 
and the NATO-led Libyan intervention – could create an auspicious environment for the country’s long-awaited 
transition. Bomba also insists that the continued pressure from Zimbabwe’s vibrant civil society organisations is vital 
for the real democratisation of Zimbabwe’s institutions. For any transition to become truly meaningful it ‘must be 
completed in the hard years after democratic election’.
My cautious optimism for Zimbabwe’s  
2012 elections
Briggs Bomba
Introduction
I argue in this Opinion that there are essentially three 
reasons for cautious optimism in Zimbabwe today. Firstly, 
the fact that the 2012 elections will be President Robert 
Mugabe’s last elections will dramatically change the 
shape of Zimbabwe’s political scene. In this context civil 
society organisations in Zimbabwe are hopeful that the 
elections will represent a leap forward into a new era, but 
they are continuing to push extremely hard to ensure that 
the elections are conducted in an open and democratic 
environment. Pressure will increase on Zanu-PF to 
appear as a credible and democratic party. Secondly, the 
Electoral Reform Bill could make some valuable changes 
that will have a positive impact on the conduct of the 
elections. Lastly, the consequences of the Arab spring will 
pressurise Zanu-PF to open up political space, even if the 
signals remain extremely mixed. 
President Mugabe’s last election
President Mugabe, who is 88, will be participating in 
what will realistically be the last feasible election for him. I 
believe that this presents Zimbabwe with new possibilities. 
If he wins a new term he will be 93 years old by the time 
it finishes. His advanced years combined with his reported 
health problems make this the grand finale for him. Indeed, 
Zanu-PF’s failed push for elections in 2011 – attempting 
to hold elections before adequate safeguards and reforms 
were in place – was driven by their own recognition that 
time is fast running out for President Mugabe to lead the 
party in an election, in any meaningful way.
Given how President Mugabe’s person is intertwined with 
the character of the Zimbabwe crisis, his imminent exit 
from the political stage is a very significant factor with far-
reaching impact on the country’s politics. However, I want 
to make it clear that I do not believe that the protracted 
Zimbabwe crisis can be reduced to Mugabe’s ‘evil’ or 
‘Machiavellian’ character. Nor is Mugabe – as he has tried 
to present himself – an ‘anti-imperialist figure’, fighting for 
Zimbabwe’s poor against international powers that are 
trying to unseat him.1 
Yet Mugabe is rightly regarded domestically and on the 
international stage as a major stumbling block. Riddled 
by factions, only Mugabe has been able to keep together 
Zanu-PF. A post-Mugabe Zanu-PF will be a much 
weaker force and incapable of continued domination 
over Zimbabwe’s politics and national affairs. Indeed after 
Mugabe Zanu-PF will not have the ability to dominate 
critical areas and organs of the state such as control over 
economic resources, the security sector and social forces 
such as the war veterans and the rural population. Mugabe 
has been an important glue for the party-state with, until 
relatively recently, serious constituencies of rural support. 
In building for this eventuality the main objective for the 
future must be the critical importance of competitive 
politics and a vibrant civil society to act as a watchdog to 
the activities of political parties. Civil society activists have 
a clear vision: never again shall a single political party have 
unchallenged power and dominance. 
Electoral reforms and shared power
My second reason for cautious optimism stems from the 
reform process that is currently under way in Zimbabwe. 
The next general election is likely to take place under 
improved conditions given the current constitutional 
reform process and both internal and external pressure 
for electoral change. This might seem like naive optimism 
to many but I do not think it is. The Zimbabwe Electoral 
Amendment Bill currently before parliament introduces 
a limited, though important number of reforms that will 
represent an improvement in the rules under which 
elections are held. 
2Before I go into the issues being confronted by the Bill we 
need to consider the circumstances of the last elections. 
The 2008 elections were a tragic disappointment for 
Zimbabweans. Parliamentary elections gave the leader 
of the opposition, Morgan Tsvangirai’s Movement for 
Democratic Change 99 seats compared to Zanu-PF’s 
97; a breakaway faction of the MDC led by Arthur 
Mutambara won ten seats and the former Zanu-PF 
minister Simba Makoni’s organisation won eight per cent 
of the Presidential vote and no parliamentary seats. This 
gave the combined opposition a majority in the 210-seat 
parliament. While Zanu-PF did not reject the results of 
the parliamentary elections soon after, on 20 March 
2008, they unleashed the bloodiest repression of any 
election since 1980. From April to September that year 
there were more than 15,000 violations of human rights 
and an estimated 200 murders.2
Paradoxically the 2008 elections were conducted with 
more openness than we had seen for years. So unlike 
in previous elections, there was not a widespread 
campaign of violence before the election and the MDC 
operated in a degree of freedom. Much of this was due 
to the role of the regional organisation, the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC), in insisting 
on changes to elections following mediation in 2007. 
SADC mediation ensured that the results from individual 
polling stations were posted outside the station. Even 
if the violent aftermath of the elections saw SADC 
help shore-up Mugabe’s rule, the regional body was 
an important player in regulating the conduct of the 
elections in the first place. With the worst violence over 
by September, the Global Political Agreement (GPA) 
was signed by Zimbabwe’s main political parties leading 
to a Government of National Unity in 2009. The GPA 
mandated the government to launch a reform process 
into the constitution and the conduct of elections. It 
was deemed vital that the legal machinery for holding 
elections in Zimbabwe was revisited.
I shall now explain some of the intended consequences 
of the current bill. It covers the legal machine governing 
the election, including voter registration, the voters roll, 
presidential elections and results, and vote recounts. 
The Bill is a combination of positive measures and half-
hearted reforms. For example, the requirement in the 
Bill that the voters roll be available to political parties, 
candidates and the public, and also be made available 
online – a common practice in most democracies – is 
a very valuable development. However, there are other 
areas that are murkier. The Bill retains the system 
whereby the President sets the date of elections and 
ministers maintain some control over the electoral 
processes. As the Zimbabwe Election Support Network 
(ZESN) has stated, ‘It means they are both players 
and referees in the same game which puts the other 
contestants at a disadvantage.’ 3 However, even with 
these doubts I remain confident that the election will 
have to be conducted with greater openness.
Serious problems, which cannot be legislated against, 
remain. While it is tempting to characterise government 
in Zimbabwe as shared power by the three main parties 
the reality is a continual imbalance in favour of Zanu-
PF. Though the recent escalation of political violence in 
Zimbabwe was condemned by the leaders of the major 
parties in government at a joint meeting in November 
such initiatives are rare. There is a strong sense that 
Zanu-PF is responsible for the overwhelming majority 
of political violence. In the middle of November the 
organisation Crisis in Zimbabwe was clear about 
apportioning blame: ‘the problem is that the same people 
who call for peace and non-violence are the same people 
who ululate when their people cause violence.’ MDC 
rallies in October and November had to be cancelled 
because of the continual reality of violence by Zanu-PF 
militants. As a consequence civil society must press for 
the next elections to take place under conditions that 
reflect genuine negotiations and settlement by the main 
political actors and these must be on-going in 2012.
International Context
Added to this, is the changed international context which 
will help increase the possibility of a fairer process. 
The international block with the greatest leverage on 
Zimbabwe – SADC – has been firmer on Zimbabwe since 
South Africa’s President Jacob Zuma won the elections 
in 2009. SADC refused to accept President Mugabe’s 
earlier push for general elections in 2011, before the 
necessary reforms were in place. SADC’s influence has 
played heavily on the positive delay of elections until 
2012. In addition, at the SADC Heads of State meetings 
in Zambia in March this year, President Mugabe was 
warned of the risk of Egyptian-style uprisings if he failed 
to open up democratic space. The SADC chairperson 
directly warned President Mugabe that unless action 
was taken to address the people’s grievances there was 
3potential for uprisings in Zimbabwe. This shift in SADC’s 
approach may have already had a deterrent effect by 
curbing the worst excesses of state-sponsored political 
violence. South Africa, SADC and the wider international 
community is unlikely to ignore an attempt by the regime 
to suppress protests.
We should also note a new interventionist approach to 
international politics as shown by events in Ivory Coast 
and Libya (which saw UN and NATO interventions 
respectively). Although there is no immediate prospect 
for similar intervention in Zimbabwe, if there is an 
attempt by Zanu-PF to suppress a mass uprising this 
may change. President Mugabe and the Zanu-PF 
hierarchy have expressed clear concern that Zimbabwe 
could be the next target and Mugabe himself has 
changed his language from boasting about political 
violence to preaching ‘peace’ in what are clear efforts 
to avoid any justification for a potential external 
intervention in Zimbabwe. On 11 November after the 
cross-party meeting condemning political violence 
Mugabe explained, ‘Let us walk the talk of peace. This is 
our sincere plea from our hearts.’ 4
Of course, I am cautious. Signs are mixed. The current 
trial of six pro-democracy activists in Harare for 
attending a meeting about the Arab spring in February 
reflects Zanu-PF’s nervousness about North African-
style resistance. Some details about the case will 
illustrate Zanu-PF’s considerable paranoia about this. On 
19 February, 45 people were arrested after the police 
stormed a meeting in Harare at the Zimbabwe Labour 
Centre. Participants had just watched a video about the 
mass popular upsurge in Egypt and Tunisia, and were 
holding a discussion. Though most were released, six 
were initially charged with treason and tortured in prison. 
These charges were reduced to ‘seeking to overthrow 
the government’, carrying a possible ten-year sentence. 
The trial is currently taking place in Harare.
While questions remain as to whether Zanu-PF and 
hard-line elements in the military in particular will allow a 
transfer of power to take place if they lose the election, 
there are further factors that make a power transfer 
likely to happen. A key element of this is the influence of 
events in North Africa, Ivory Coast and the most recent 
Zambia elections. These basic lessons are translating 
into what appears to be a new preparedness to ‘defend 
the vote’ through mass action. While it remains to be 
seen if this attitude will go beyond rhetoric the recent fall 
of dictatorships in the face of mass uprisings in North 
Africa will likely influence similar spontaneous eruptions 
in Harare should the elections be blatantly stolen. The 
cost of rigging the next election might be deemed too 
high for the regime. 
Action needed now: minimum conditions for a free 
and fair election
For democratic transformation in Zimbabwe to take 
place pressure and support needs to be directed 
at securing minimum conditions for a free and fair 
election. They must focus on ensuring a clean voters 
roll, a peaceful environment, and a credible electoral 
administration. Much of this pressure can come from 
inside the country. Zimbabwe has a very advanced 
grass-roots civic society with a generation of activists 
who have resisted the regime’s abuse of human rights 
and democracy over the past 20 years. Numerous 
groups continue to work in harsh circumstances in 
advocacy on constitutional and electoral reforms to 
create the right environment for democratic elections. 
Practical support and solidarity is needed now, more 
than ever, for this kind of work to ensure constitutional 
reforms are carried out in time for the elections. This 
should not be a partisan agenda – the question of who 
wins elections must be left to the electorate. What is 
important here is the principle of democratic elections 
to produce a government with unquestionable 
legitimacy to allow the country to move forward.
Outside Zimbabwe the international community can 
play a role by offering practical support to achieve 
the best conditions for democratic elections. I believe 
it is important for key actors such as the US, EU 
and the Commonwealth to recognise their limited 
leverage when it comes to securing political reforms 
in Zimbabwe; unilateral action and grand posturing 
will be counterproductive. This is not to say these 
organisations do not have a role to play in raising 
concerns on the global stage about Zimbabwe’s 
election and human rights but I believe practical 
results can best be achieved through multilateral 
action and coordination with African bodies such as 
SADC and the African Union at the level of individual 
member states. 
4Preparing for post-election democratic governance
We also need to think beyond the elections. As 
Zimbabwe approaches this defining political moment 
urgent attention must be directed towards institutional 
reforms to ensure a democratic, transparent, 
accountable and effective government. Sadly, there 
is very little focus on this highly important work. Local 
initiatives and grass-roots international support in this 
area should be escalated. One powerful example of 
effective international action has been the coordinated 
protests outside Zimbabwe’s embassies and High 
Commissions across the world against the bogus 
charges levelled against the six pro-democracy activists 
on trial for organising the meeting described above on 
the Arab spring.5 The substance of the transformation 
agenda cannot be left to the post-elections period. 
It is vital that concerted activism by Zimbabwe’s civil 
society organisations is directed now at the form and 
content of the democratic transformation process in 
order to avoid a false transition. Across the political 
divide real democrats can practically demonstrate their 
commitment to open government by how they conduct 
business. There is no reason why any ministry led by any 
of the Movement for Democratic Change factions or 
Zanu-PF should wait until after the elections to practise 
transparent and accountable government. Similarly, 
there is no reason why international donors must wait 
until after the elections or Mugabe’s departure to 
support these practices across the country.
There are initiatives to allow greater and more 
responsible financial management, though many of 
these do not go far enough. I welcome provisions in 
the 2010 updated Public Finance Management Act 
where revenues collected by Government and any funds 
coming into the Exchequer Account are managed in 
an open and transparent way. But the act should be 
amended to ensure that parliament is guaranteed real 
participation in loan and debt management, ensuring 
that the terms and conditions of loans are openly 
debated. 
These are vital concerns for us. The role of IMF loans 
and conditionality were devastating to Zimbabwe in 
the 1990s. The government introduced the first full 
Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) in 
1991, although the IMF had been pressing it to reduce 
expenditure and devalue the Zimbabwe dollar from the 
early 1980s. The IMF insisted on trade liberalisation, 
the removal of import controls and export incentives, 
deregulation including changes to what was regarded 
as ‘restrictive’ labour legislation and widespread public 
sector reforms. The government pursued policies 
involving privatisation and the closure of state companies 
deemed unprofitable. The year after the implementation 
of the ESAP saw a huge 11 per cent fall in per capita 
GDP. More than 20,000 jobs were lost between January 
1991 and July 1993. In 1993 unemployment had 
reached a record 1.3 million from a total population of 
about 10 million. By 1994, 25,000 civil service jobs had 
been lost.6 
A new Zimbabwe must strengthen parliament’s 
participation in the frequently ‘shadowy’ world of 
conditionality and international loans to avoid a repeat of 
structural adjustment on the back of international loans 
agreed between elites. While there are some important 
steps forward, these are not enough. It is only from an 
extension of these small but important reforms that a 
government that works for the people can emerge. So 
will the real Zimbabwean democrats please stand up? 
Conclusion
Despite my natural hesitancy I believe that these three 
pillars – Mugabe’s last election, electoral reform and the 
international context – will combine to make 2012’s 
election a decisive turning point in Zimbabwe. However, 
we must not lapse into complacency. I have given some 
ideas about where we need to remain vigilant to ensure 
that the elections are properly and cleanly run, but I 
have also indicated that much work needs to be carried 
out to create democratic institutions that can sustain 
democracy in Zimbabwe deep into the 21st century.
Therefore maximum pressure and support must focus 
not just on initiatives for democratic elections, but 
also very importantly on the work to institutionalise 
democratic, accountable and effective government 
afterwards. The transition does not finish after a single 
election but must be filled out and completed in the 
hard years after that. Solidarity with the democratic 
movement in Zimbabwe has always been globalised, 
from the 1970s, when civil society organisations across 
the world extended support to the liberation struggle, to 
the campaign for democratic elections in the late 1990s. 
This is the time when solidarity – from the North and 
5South – is most needed for those on the frontlines of 
the democratic transformation agenda in Zimbabwe as 
we enter what may be the most important year in the 
country for a generation. 
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